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Grab對決Go-Jek:亞洲超級應用之爭的幕后故事

這兩家打車服務公司如今正在展開全方位的對決,從送貨一直到為東南亞中產階級提供抵押產品。

雅加達街頭互為競爭對手的Grab和Go-Jek摩的駕駛員與乘客。圖片來源:Dimas Ardian—Bloomberg via Getty Images

所有人都喜愛冰淇淋。

“冰淇淋日”便源于這一理念。該節日是Uber于2012年發起的一項促銷活動。為了取悅客戶,這家拼車服務巨頭允許客戶在每個夏天的某一天通過Uber應用來安排即時的甜點送餐服務。然而在2015年6月,隨著這家美國公司將該活動推廣至53個國家,馬來西亞企業家陳炳耀看到了將Uber趕出市場的機會,并亮出了極具吸引力的本土打車服務品牌——Grab。

就在Uber剛剛采取促銷活動之后,Grab祭出了真正令馬來西亞人為之瘋狂的熱帶水果:臭氣熏天的榴蓮。首都吉隆坡的客戶可以讓Grab司機將這種刺鼻的水果直接送到家門口。為了實現這個承諾,Grab不得不設計特殊的包裝,而且雖然榴蓮被認為是一種珍饈,但其釋放出的氣味難以去除,因此被很多機場和酒店拒之門外。Grab克服了這一困難,并以每份1林吉特(約合24美分)這樣的超值價來出售。很快,所有榴蓮幾乎銷售一空,如今“GrabDurian”促銷券已經進入第四個年頭。

陳炳耀笑著說:“外國人肯定想不出這個點子。Uber還沒有完全理解需要本土化到什么程度”,才能贏得東南亞市場。

Grab采用了超級本土化策略,并獲得了巨大的成功。自從2012年在吉隆坡郊區的一所倉庫創建以來,公司業務已經拓展至8個國家,擁有280萬名司機,比Uber的200萬還要多。Grab表示,其應用已經在1.39億個設備上安裝,每日處理的打車訂單數超過了600萬個。Grab 2018年的營收達到了10億美元,預計今年的營收將翻倍。在這一過程中,Grab擊敗了以冰淇淋為賣點的競爭對手:2018年3月,Uber宣布把東南亞業務出售給Grab,用于換取Grab 27.5%的股份,以及Uber在Grab董事會的一個席位。

37歲的陳炳耀與聯合創始人陳慧玲(馬來西亞人,35歲,與陳炳耀沒有血緣關系)的夢想遠非租車業務那么簡單。他們試圖將Grab轉型為一家“日常超級應用”,從而從各個方面與消費者互動,并提供食品運送、數字支付、金融服務,甚至是車載醫療服務。在該地區6.5億名消費者中,大多數如今才剛剛獲得中國和西方早已習以為常的便捷服務。Grab希望這一應用能夠滿足消費者的任何產品和服務需求。

東南亞2017年的GDP達到了2.8萬億美元,如果把這個地區看作是一個單一國家,則可算是全球第七大經濟體;按當前的增速,2030年它將躍居至第四的位置。但對于投資者來說,市場規模僅是其中的一個吸引點。超級應用提供了一個與客戶互聯的新模式,以及搜集大量有關客戶喜好與購買行為寶貴數據的機會。最先采用這一模式的是阿里巴巴的支付寶和騰訊的微信。馬克·扎克伯格在最近的博客中暗示,他希望Facebook能夠模仿這種模式。很多人認為來自于超級應用服務及其產生數據的收入較打車服務來說更穩定,更有利可圖,也更容易擴張。因為就打車服務而言,即便其增速呈直線上升,但利潤依然飄忽不定。

We all scream for ice cream.

That’s the idea behind Ice Cream Day, a promotion launched by Uber Technologies in 2012. The ride-share giant courts customers by allowing them, for one day each summer, to arrange instant dessert delivery through the Uber app. But in June 2015, as the American powerhouse expanded that campaign across 53 countries, Malaysian entrepreneur Anthony Tan saw a chance to cast Uber as an outsider—and burnish the appeal of his homegrown ride-hailing venture, Grab.

Just after Uber’s event, Grab offered what Malaysians really scream for: smelly durians. Customers in Kuala Lumpur, the capital, could have one of the pungent fruits rushed to their doorstep by a Grab driver. To deliver on that promise, Grab had to devise special packaging: Durians, though considered a great delicacy, emit an odor so overpowering that they are banned in many airports and hotels. Grab surmounted that obstacle and offered the fruits at the bargain price of a single ringgit (24¢). They sold out almost immediately, and the “GrabDurian” marketing coup is now well into its fourth year.

“No foreigner would have thought to do that,” chortles Tan. Uber, he says, “couldn’t fully appreciate how local you needed to go” to win in Southeast Asia.

Grab has employed hyperlocal strategies with remarkable success. Since its 2012 launch from a warehouse closet in a gritty Kuala Lumpur suburb, the venture has expanded to eight countries. It boasts 2.8 million drivers—more than the 2 million claimed by Uber. Grab says its app has been downloaded to 139 million devices and that it processes more than 6 million ride orders a day. Grab’s 2018 revenue topped $1 billion, and it expects to double that figure this year. Along the way, it outlasted its ice-cream-peddling rival: In March 2018, Uber announced that it would sell its Southeast Asian operations to Grab in exchange for a 27.5% stake in the company and a seat on its board.

Tan, 37, and cofounder Hooi Ling Tan (a 35-year-old fellow Malaysian to whom Anthony is not related) have aspirations stretching far beyond the taxi business. They aim to transform Grab into an “everyday super-app” that engages consumers on multiple fronts—offering food delivery, digital payments, financial services, and even health care along with rides. Most of the region’s 650 million consumers are only now getting access to conveniences long taken for granted in China and the West; Grab hopes to be the app that connects them to whatever goods and services they demand.

With a 2017 GDP of $2.8 trillion, Southeast Asia, were it a single country, would be the world’s seventh largest economy; at its current growth rate, it would rank No. 4 by 2030. But for investors, market size is only part of the appeal. Super-apps promise a new mode of connecting with customers and an opportunity to amass a vast data trove about their preferences and purchasing behavior. It’s a model pioneered in China by Alibaba’s Alipay and Tencent’s WeChat; Mark Zuckerberg, in a recent blog post, hinted that he hopes Facebook can emulate it. Many believe revenue from super-app services and the data they generate will prove to be more stable, more profitable, and easier to scale than revenues from ride-hailing—where profits have been elusive even as growth skyrockets.

創業費用:借助從商學院演講競賽中拿到的2.5萬美元,陳炳耀與陳慧玲創建了Grab。圖片來源:Photograph by Stefen Chow for Fortune

在東南亞,超級應用模型的發展速度比全球其他地區更快。這一點也有助于解釋Grab為什么能夠從多家行業巨頭手中籌集到86億美元的風投資金,這些投資者包括日本的軟銀集團和豐田汽車、中國打車服務巨頭滴滴出行,以及微軟。Grab在近期融資輪的估值超過了140億美元,也讓Grab成為了東南亞最有價值的獨角獸。

陳炳耀認為,Grab之所以比Uber更受歡迎,原因在于它迎合了當地消費者的需求。在收入相對較低的地區,Grab提供了獲取廉價出租車和摩托車的平臺,而不是Uber昂貴的“黑色轎車”。與此同時,Uber還要求使用信用卡支付,但Grab打造了一個中間網絡平臺,幫助“沒有銀行賬戶”的客戶用現金支付。(別忘了,還有榴蓮!)

但在最近的競爭中,Grab卻沒有任何主場優勢。Grab將其總部遷至新加坡,但陳炳耀最近卻將其70%的時間用在了印尼。很多分析師認為,占據印尼的市場對于樹立區域性數字主導權至關重要。印尼貢獻了東南亞40%的GDP,而且其對科技很在行的消費者比例異常之高。社交媒體管理平臺HootSuite稱,74%的印尼人都可以利用移動網絡在網上購物,這個數字在全球排名第一。

問題在于:在這個群島國家,Grab的司機必須與印尼的Go-Jek搶客,而后者的投資者包括谷歌和騰訊。

Go-Jek擁有100多萬名司機,而且每月處理的交易數超過了1億筆,涵蓋2500萬名用戶。Go-Jek也是一個超級應用:公司的18類按需服務包括Go-Mart(百貨購物)、Go-Clean(房間打掃)、Go-Glam(理發和化妝)以及Go-?Massage(顧名思義按摩服務)。Go-Jek應用的下載量達到了1.08億次,而且該公司稱至少近半使用其應用的用戶也會使用其支付服務Go-Pay。

Go-Jek的創始人34歲的納迪艾姆·馬卡里姆則有著自己的區域發展夢想。它表示,Grab的兩位創始人抄襲了他的超級應用模式。馬卡里姆說:“很有意思的是,Grab已經開始嘗試剽竊我們的創意。要我說,‘不是吧?’你們倆第一年抄襲Uber的模式?然后接下來的三年又來抄襲Go-Jek?”馬卡里姆的諷刺遭到了Grab針鋒相對的反駁,這兩位創始人并未稱這一理念屬于其原創。在給《財富》雜志的一封電子郵件中,二陳稱“有好主意并不一定能保證成功。”

此次交鋒也暗示了馬卡里姆和二陳在這場競爭中的私人恩怨。這種蔑視源于相互的熟知:這三位曾是哈佛商學院的同學,也曾是志趣相投的至交。

In Southeast Asia, the super-app model is evolving more rapidly than anywhere else in the world. That helps explain why Grab has raised $8.6 billion in venture funding from powerful players including Japan’s SoftBank Group and Toyota Motor, Chinese ride-hailing giant Didi Chuxing, and Microsoft. Grab’s most recent funding round values it at more than $14 billion, making Grab Southeast Asia’s most valuable unicorn.

Grab prevailed over Uber, Anthony argues, because it adapted to local consumers’ needs. In a relatively low-income region, Grab provided a platform for cheap taxis and motorcycles to counter Uber’s expensive “black cars.” And while Uber required payment by credit card, Grab created a network of intermediaries to help “unbanked” customers pay cash. (Plus, those durians!)

But in Grab’s latest battle, it doesn’t hold home-court advantage. Grab has moved its headquarters to Singapore, but Anthony Tan has recently been spending more than 70% of his time in Indonesia. Many analysts believe that winning there is crucial to establishing regional digital hegemony. Indonesia accounts for 40% of Southeast Asia’s GDP, and it boasts unusually tech-savvy consumers: 74% of Indonesians with mobile Internet access make e-commerce purchases, the highest figure in the world, according to social media management platform HootSuite.

Here’s the rub: Across the archipelago, Grab’s drivers must vie for passengers with rivals from Go-Jek, an Indonesian venture whose backers include Google and Tencent.

Go-Jek employs more than a million drivers and processes more than 100 million transactions for 25 million monthly users. Go-Jek is also a super-app: The venture’s 18 on-demand services include Go-Mart (grocery shopping), Go-Clean (housecleaning), Go-Glam (hairstyling and makeovers), and Go-?Massage (self-explanatory). Go-Jek claims 108 million app downloads and says at least half of those who have used its app have also used its payment service, Go-Pay.

Go-Jek’s founder, 34-year-old Nadiem Makarim, harbors regional ambitions of his own—and he says the two Tans ripped off his super-app model. “It’s really interesting that Grab has started to try to take that word away from us,” Makarim says. “I’m like, ‘Excuse me?’ You spend the first years of your life copying Uber? And then the next three years of your life copying Go-Jek?” Makarim’s jab elicits a pointed rejoinder from Grab, whose founders make no claim to inventing the concept. In an email to Fortune, the Tans note that “having a good idea does not guarantee success.”

The exchange hints at the personal acrimony that has crept into the rivalry between Makarim and the Tans. It’s a contempt rooted in familiarity: All three were classmates at Harvard Business School, and they once considered one another kindred spirits.

****

在此之前,Grab和Go-Jek幾乎是井水不犯河水。如今,隨著其業務模式和目標市場的重疊,這兩家公司似乎進入了碰撞軌道。在很多城市,這兩家公司掀起了無底線價格戰,大幅降低打車、摩的以及其他服務的費用。雙方的沖突有著令人迷惑的視覺感。在印尼,這兩家公司均采用綠色作為其企業顏色,Grab的司機穿著森林綠制服,而Go-Jek的司機則身著一身趨近于酸橙色的黃綠色服裝。在雅加達,這兩家公司的車隊將城市的大道變成了一條條脈動的綠色河流。

如今,Grab處于領先地位。它的覆蓋市場比Go-Jek更廣,而且在該區域的六大市場均獲得了電子支付牌照。(Go-Jek僅在印尼和菲律賓提供此類服務。)在收購Uber之后,Grab的打車服務已經在新加坡、馬來西亞、菲律賓和越南處于市場主導地位,同時也在上述市場面臨著Go-Jek的競爭。ABI Research稱,即便在印尼本土,Grab也拿到了62%的市場份額,但Go-Jek對這一數字存在異議。

然而,Go-Jek是一個打不倒的對手。Crunchbase稱,該公司籌集了31億美元,而且分析師預計,其估值達到了110億美元。馬卡里姆認為,假以時日,Go-Jek將以服務的廣度擊敗對手。雖然業界廣泛認為兩家公司的打車服務都在虧錢,但馬卡里姆稱,Go-Jek很快將在其非運輸領域盈利。(這兩家公司均未按業務門類公開披露其營收數字。)

投資者發現這場競爭越來越有意思,而且已經到了剎不住車的地步。新加坡歐洲工商管理學院的創業學副教授杰森·戴維斯表示:“人們傾向于將Grab在短期內籌集大量資金的事實看作是公司實力的象征。”但在他看來,Grab在擴張過程中已經是“超出了自己的能力范圍”。戴維斯負責指導有關打車服務公司的案例分析。在一開始,他會讓學生投票表決自己愿意投資哪家公司。他說:“所有人都會說Grab,也有說Uber的。Go-Jek通常是那個被遠遠落在后面的第三個選項。”然而在課程結束之時,這一次序又成了“Go-Jek,Grab,Uber。”

Until recently, Grab and Go-Jek mostly stayed out of each other’s lanes. Now, as their business models and target markets converge, the two seem to be on a collision course. In many cities, the companies have embarked on a no-holds-barred price war, slashing fees for car rides, motorcycle trips, and other services. The conflict can be visually bewildering. In Indonesia, both ventures have adopted green as their corporate color, with Grab’s drivers clad in forest and Go-Jek’s decked in a shade of kelly verging on lime. In Jakarta, the combined fleets have transformed major thoroughfares into pulsing rivers of green.

For now, Grab is the front-runner. It operates in more markets than Go-Jek and holds e-payment licenses in the region’s six largest markets. (Go-Jek offers such services only in Indonesia and the Philippines.) With its Uber acquisition, Grab has the ride-hailing market-share lead in Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, though Go-Jek competes in each. Even in Indonesia itself, Grab holds 62% of the ride-share market, according to ABI Research, although Go-Jek disputes that figure.

Still, Go-Jek is a formidable foe. The venture has raised $3.1 billion, according to Crunchbase, and analysts estimate its valuation at $11 billion. And ?Makarim argues that Go-Jek’s breadth of services will win out over time. Although ride-hailing business lines at both ventures are widely believed to lose money, Makarim claims Go-Jek is close to profitability in its non-transport segments. (Neither company publicly breaks out revenue figures by business line.)

Investors find the race increasingly fascinating—and tough to handicap. “People tend to interpret the fact that Grab has raised so much money so quickly as a sign of strength,” says Jason Davis, an associate professor of entrepreneurship at the business school Insead in Singapore. But in his opinion, Grab has “stretched itself beyond its capacity” in its expansion. Davis teaches a case study on ride-hailing ventures. At the outset, he asks students to vote on which one they would have wanted to invest in. “Everyone begins saying Grab, maybe Uber,” he says. “Go-Jek is usually a distant third.” By the end of the course? “It’s Go-Jek, Grab, Uber.”

****

這場戰爭據稱是在哈佛大學的教室中開始的。當時,在2011年春季,二陳與馬卡里姆選修了“金字塔底的企業”(又稱“B-BoP”)課程,由高級講師邁克·初教授。該課程的名稱源于商學學者CK·普拉哈拉德和斯圖爾德·哈特所發布的一篇論文。這兩位學者認為新興市場最大的機遇并非源于迎合富人的需求,而是來自于為首次接觸市場經濟的有抱負的數十億窮人提供服務。

陳慧玲與馬卡里姆在就讀于哈佛之前是好友。這兩位都曾經供職于麥肯錫,擔任咨詢師。陳慧玲在吉隆坡工作,而馬卡里姆則在雅加達。他們都沒有見過陳炳耀,但都知道陳炳耀是陳興洲的小兒子,而且酷愛社交。陳興洲是馬來西亞最知名的實業家之一。

這三位對于其祖國失敗的交通系統感到失望不已。對于自稱為“電子產品控”、有著機械工程學學位的陳慧玲來說,其祖國運輸系統最大的弱點在于安全。在她十幾歲的時候,人們認為吉隆坡的出租車非常不靠譜,為了在商場與朋友見面,她甚至不得不坐家人的車前往。在陳慧玲供職于麥肯錫期間,從事股票經紀工作的母親通常得一直等到后半夜才能收到女兒回家的消息。

陳炳耀也有同樣的擔憂,也發現了其中存在的機遇。在就讀商學院之前的夏天,他和好友租了40輛車,打算經營出租車服務,但他們并不知道如何將車輛與用戶進行配對。陳炳耀的祖父是出租車司機,對于陳炳耀來說,效仿Uber在美國的做法,也就是使用智能手機解決這一問題的前景十分誘人,但也為他帶來了煩惱,因為他的父親希望他能夠繼承家族業務——在該地區制造和銷售尼桑汽車。陳炳耀深知,成立自己的公司會被這個以服從為榮的家族看作是公開的叛逆。他回憶道:“真的是很難辦。大家都知道,我的父親非常崇尚儒家思想。”

最終,抓住這一商業機會的思維邏輯占了上風。陳慧玲與陳炳耀共同制定了一個針對東南亞市場、基于應用的打車服務方案,并參加了匯豐年度商業計劃大賽。他們獲得了季軍,斬獲了2.5萬美元,這筆種子資金足夠用于創建其稱之為MyTeksi的企業。

This battle arguably began in a classroom at Harvard. There, in the spring of 2011, the Tans and Makarim enrolled in “Businesses at the Base of the Pyramid” (also known as “B-BoP”), taught by senior lecturer Michael Chu. The course takes its name from a thesis popularized by business scholars C.K. Prahalad and Stuart L. Hart, who argued that the biggest opportunities in emerging markets lay not in catering to the affluent but in serving the billions of aspiring poor joining the market economy for the first time.

Hooi Ling Tan and Makarim were friends before coming to Harvard. Both had worked as consultants at McKinsey, she in Kuala Lumpur and he in Jakarta. Neither knew Anthony, but both knew of him—the gregarious youngest son of Tan Heng Chew, one of Malaysia’s most prominent industrialists.

All three shared a frustration with the failings of their home countries’ transportation systems. For Hooi Ling, a self-described “gadget freak” with a degree in mechanical engineering, the main defect was safety. In her teen years, Kuala Lumpur’s taxis were considered so unreliable that, even to meet friends at the mall, she had to be driven by a family member. During her ?McKinsey stint, her mother, a stockbroker, would wait up well past midnight to monitor her return home.

Anthony shared those concerns, along with a sense of opportunity. The summer before business school, he and a friend tried to run a taxi service with a fleet of 40 rented cars—but they couldn’t figure out how to match cars and riders. For Anthony, whose grandfather was a taxi driver, the prospect of solving that problem using smartphones, as Uber was doing in the U.S., was enticing. But it was also fraught. His father expected him to join the family business, which manufactures and distributes Nissan vehicles throughout the region. Launching a venture of his own, Anthony knew, would be tantamount to open rebellion in a household that prized obedience. “It was really tough,” he recalls. “My dad, you know, he’s very Confucian.”

In the end, the logic of the opportunity prevailed. Hooi Ling and Anthony teamed up to enter HBS’s annual business plan contest with a proposal for an app-based taxi-hailing service tailored to Southeast Asia. They came in second, earning $25,000—enough seed money to launch a venture they called MyTeksi.

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路運之外的競爭

Grab與Go-Jek都將自己稱之為“超級應用”,二者均在出租車業務之外的眾多領域招攬客戶。以下是它們針鋒相對的其他一些行業。

移動金融

Grab和Go-Jek都希望效仿中國支付寶和微信的做法,因為后兩家公司的“數字錢包”幾乎可用于支付一切商品和服務。GrabPay已經進駐6個東南亞國家,而且在與萬事達卡達成新預付卡服務合作之后,可以將服務延伸至更廣泛的區域。借助Grab Financial Services,Grab可以向沒有銀行賬戶的當地消費者和企業家提供貸款,并使用其數字支付歷史記錄幫助創建信用檔案。

對于Go-Jek的Go-Pay系統而言,其當前的經營地幾乎都在印尼;公司稱今年處理的交易額有望遠超60億美元。

移動百貨

在Go-Jek在2015年推出此類應用之后,GoFood迅速成為應用菜單中最受歡迎的功能之一。創始人馬卡里姆最初將預制食品送貨服務看作是能夠讓司機在非交通高峰時段有事可做的一項業務,但如今它卻成為了公司銷售額的有力推手。其每年處理的食品送貨額超過了20億美元。Go-Jek用戶還可以通過Go-Mart下單購買百貨。

GrabFood送餐服務在2018年年初急速擴張,當時,Grab收購了Uber東南亞業務,包括UberEats。百貨送貨服務于8月上線,當時,Grab與馬來西亞送貨服務公司HappyFresh合作推出了GrabFresh服務。

其他移動服務

為了應對雅加達和印尼其他城市異常壯觀的交通堵塞問題,Go-Jek已經部署了其摩的車隊,為其客戶提供按需服務,具體門類包括GoClean(打掃房間)、Go-Glam(理發和化妝),甚至是Go-Massage按摩服務。

雙方沒有GrabDrug或GrabDoctor服務,至少目前沒有,但Grab在8月宣布與中國平安醫療科技公司成立合資企業,探討通過應用提供醫療咨詢服務,以及送藥和就醫預訂服務。

Taking the Race Off-Road

Grab and Go-Jek position themselves as “super-apps,” wooing customers in fields far beyond the taxi business. Here are some other industries in which they compete head-to-head.

Mobile Finance

Both Grab and Go-Jek hope to borrow a page from China’s Alipay and WeChat apps, whose “digital wallets” can be used to pay for just about everything. GrabPay operates in six Southeast Asian nations—and could go wider with help from a new prepaid-card partnership with Mastercard. Through Grab Financial Services, Grab offers loans to local consumers and entrepreneurs who otherwise have no bank accounts, using their digital-payment histories to help establish creditworthiness.

Go-Jek’s Go-Pay system currently operates mostly in Indonesia; the company says it’s on pace to process well over $6 billion worth of transactions this year.

Mobile Groceries

After Go-Jek launched its app in 2015, GoFood quickly became one of its most popular menu options. Founder Nadiem Makarim originally saw prepared-food delivery as a way to keep drivers busy during off-peak hours. But it’s now a sales driver in its own right, processing more than $2 billion worth of food deliveries a year. Go-Jek users can also order groceries through Go-Mart.

The GrabFood restaurant-delivery service expanded dramatically in early 2018, when Grab bought the Southeast Asian operations of Uber—including UberEats. Grocery delivery joined the portfolio in August, when Grab launched GrabFresh in partnership with Malaysian delivery service HappyFresh.

Mobile Miscellany

To combat the epic gridlock in Jakarta and other Indonesian cities, Go-Jek has deployed its motorcycle-taxi fleet to bring ondemand services to its customers, with options including GoClean (housekeeping), Go-Glam (hairstyling and makeovers), and even Go-Massage.

There’s no GrabDrug or GrabDoctor—at least not yet—but Grab in August announced a joint venture with China’s Ping An Healthcare and Technology to explore delivering medical consultations via app, along with medicine delivery and appointment booking.

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接受過美國教育的馬卡里姆出生于印尼法律和政治世家,他認為自己可以通過參加B-BoP,為其已經創建的企業拿到貸款。Go-Jek的名字源于印尼語ojek,意為該國數百萬計的摩的司機。在雅加達這個有著3000萬人口的龐大都市,摩的司機一直都是在該國克服其傳奇般交通堵塞的最快、最廉價的方式。馬卡里姆在雅加達工作時也一直為出行犯愁。他回憶道:“我有自己的司機,然而,我最后不得不搭乘這些摩的,要不我總是會遲到。”

馬卡里姆自己也承認,摩的并非是完美的解決方案。他回憶道:“在你需要他們的時候,它們總是不在你身邊。”而且其喜歡挑客的名聲也讓很多乘客對其詬病不已。盡管如此,他將其視為一種未得到利用的資源,如果能夠職業化的話,那么雅加達最令人頭疼的交通問題可能會有所改觀。馬卡里姆招聘了20名摩的司機,以及多名調度員,并給每個人買了一件綠夾克。

Grab的首位風險投資者是陳炳耀的母親。她曾坦言,自己并不了解兒子公司的業務模式,但希望這家企業能夠獲得成功,因為陳炳耀的父親不僅拒絕了陳炳耀的請求,而且威脅要將陳炳耀從巨額家族財產繼承人中除名。到2014年年底,MyTeksi已經籌集了8000萬美元資金,并已通過新品牌名GrabTaxi擴張至菲律賓、新加坡、泰國和越南。但其資金消耗速度相當之快,因為Go-Jek提供高額的司機補貼和乘客折扣。

2014年12月,Uber私募市場估值突破了400億大關,陳炳耀獲邀前往東京與軟銀董事長孫正義會面,后者是全球最有影響力的科技投資者之一。在聊了一個小時之后,孫正義開門見山地說道,他打算當打車服務行業的教父,而且他也向陳炳耀開出了難以拒絕的條件。(陳炳耀回憶道,孫正義說:“你要是不拿我的錢,你會后悔的。”)

Makarim, a U.S.-educated scion of a family prominent in Indonesian law and politics, saw B-BoP as a way to get credit for a business he had already started. He launched Go-Jek as a side hustle in 2010. Go-Jek takes its name from ojek, the Bahasa Indonesian word for the country’s millions of motorbike-taxi drivers. In Jakarta, a sprawling metropolis of 30 million, ojeks have long been the fastest, cheapest way to cut through the legendary gridlock. Working in Jakarta, Makarim, too, had struggled to get around. “I had my own driver,” he recalls. “And yet I’d always end up using these motorcycle guys because I was always running late.”

By Makarim’s own admission, ojeks were an imperfect solution. “They were never around when you needed them,” he recalls, and their reputation for haggling led many passengers to disdain them. Still, he saw them as an untapped resource that, if professionalized, might alleviate everyone’s least favorite thing about Jakarta. Makarim recruited 20 ojeks and a couple of dispatchers—and bought everyone green jackets.

Grab’s first venture investor was Anthony Tan’s mother, who confessed she didn’t understand his business model but hoped it would succeed because his father—who had already turned Anthony down—was threatening to disinherit him from the family’s considerable fortune. By late 2014, MyTeksi had amassed more than $80 million and had expanded to the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam under a new brand, GrabTaxi. But its burn rate was high, as the Tans offered aggressive promotions for drivers and discounts for passengers.

In December 2014, as Uber’s private-market valuation soared past $40 billion, Anthony was summoned to Tokyo to meet with SoftBank chairman Masayoshi Son—one of the world’s most influential tech investors. After an hour of conversation, Son cut to the chase: He intended to play godfather in ride-hailing, and he was making an offer Tan shouldn’t refuse. (“You don’t take my money, not so good for you,” Tan recalls Son saying.)

開出租之外:納迪艾姆·馬卡里姆的Go-Jek從一開始就提供食品送貨和信使服務,這樣,司機們在非高峰期也能有事做。圖片來源:Photograph by Jiro Ose for Fortune

據稱,軟銀集團向GrabTaxi注資2.5億美元,其持股比例并未對外披露。到目前為止,對于陳炳耀和孫正義來說,這筆投資事實上讓雙方都受益頗多。軟銀已經為Grab領投了多輪融資輪,最近的一次是今年3月初的14.6億美元。孫正義也是Uber的主要股東,當時在勸說Uber向Grab出售業務期間發揮了關鍵作用。

一開始,孫正義的投資對于Go-Jek來說似乎并不是什么好消息。但全球投資者開始搜尋投資美國之外的打車服務模式,而且孫正義對于Grab的注資更是助推了這一浪潮。馬卡里姆為這些投資者提供了一個新切入點:超級應用模式。

Go-Jek從一開始就是一家多門類服務企業。為了讓其司機能夠在高峰期外的時間全天候地工作,馬卡里姆鼓勵他們通過信使服務、送餐服務和其他舉措來補充載客業務。在Go-Jek應用于2015年1月推出之后,它提供了三項功能:Go-Bike、 Go-Send和Go-Food。美國投資者批評這個菜單十分混亂而且令人感到疑惑,但印尼用戶則對其稱贊不已。在一年的時間里,Go-Jek的下載量超過了1100萬次。馬卡里姆則一直在增添新的服務。當年晚些時候,他在雅加達舉行的科技大會上說:“如果你有某種需求,不管它是什么,只要它是合法的,那么就可以在60分鐘內通過Go-Jek應用得到滿足。”

這種對于綜合業務的敏感性讓Go-Jek發生了蛻變。2015年10月,它獲得了來自于新加坡NSI Ventures和紅杉資本的投資。2016年,公司籌集了5.5億美元,此輪融資由私募股權公司KKR與華平領投,也讓Go-Jek邁入了獨角獸公司陣營。在Grab于2017年年底推出支付平臺GrabPay,加入超級應用大戰時,這兩家公司已經為這場火拼積累了不少資金彈藥。

SoftBank reportedly invested $250 million in GrabTaxi, for a stake whose size neither company has disclosed. So far, for both Tan and Son, that investment has proved good indeed. SoftBank has led several more fundraising rounds for Grab, most recently for $1.46 billion in early March. And Son, who also is a major shareholder in Uber, played a decisive role in persuading that company to sell out to Grab.

Son’s investment initially sounded like bad news for Go-Jek. But global investors were beginning to scramble for opportunities to invest in the ride-hailing model outside the U.S., and Son’s Grab stake only fed the frenzy. Makarim offered these investors a new angle: a super-app model.

Go-Jek had been a multiservice venture from the outset. To keep drivers employed all day, not just during rush hours, Makarim had encouraged them to supplement passenger transport with courier services, meal delivery, and other endeavors. Shortly after the Go-Jek app launched in January 2015, it offered three options: Go-Bike, Go-Send, and Go-Food. American backers decried the menu as messy and confusing, but Indonesian users voted with their thumbs. Within a year, Go-Jek had been downloaded more than 11 million times. Makarim kept adding services. He told a tech conference in Jakarta later that year, “If you want something, whatever it is, in 60 minutes, as long as it’s legal, then you can get it on the Go-Jek app.”

The omnibus sensibility helped Go-Jek break through. In October 2015 it won funding from Singapore’s NSI Ventures and Sequoia Capital. In 2016 it raised $550 million in a round led by private equity firms KKR and Warburg Pincus, vaulting Go-Jek into the unicorn club. By the time Grab joined the super-app battle, rolling out the payment platform GrabPay late in 2017, both companies had plenty of financial ammunition for the fight.

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像火藥、意大利面和紙幣一樣,超級應用通常被認為是中國的創新。其最早的雛形便是支付寶,阿里巴巴于2004年先后創建了這項支付功能和淘寶電商平臺。支付寶已經發展成為中國占主導地位的移動支付工具,這個數字錢包與銀行賬戶和信用卡關聯,被用于支付賬單、向朋友轉賬、預訂酒店,幾乎是無所不能。而騰訊于2011年推出的微信則更加全面。微信最初旨在相互發送文本信息和照片,但騰訊增添了類似于支付寶一樣的數字錢包功能,以及一系列社交特色,以便讓這個應用更快、更奇特、用戶粘度更高。

對于那些經營上述應用的科技巨頭來說,中國的超級應用是一座數據寶山。與美國不同的是,阿里巴巴和騰訊能夠獲得來自于從不同領域的信息,并生成數億用戶的全方位檔案。這類數據引發了重大的隱私擔憂,但到目前為止,它仍然是一種資產,公司可以通過與廣告商和供應商的合作關系,以及通過自己的新產品將其轉化為貨幣。

在模仿中國的應用時,Grab和Go-Jek面臨著一個新的障礙:僅有有限的人群能夠獲得東南亞銀行的服務。在中國,超過80%的成年人都有銀行賬戶。馬來西亞和泰國的比例跟中國差不多。但在印尼,這個數字僅有約50%,而到了菲律賓和越南,這個比例則降至35%。這些差異反映了經濟發展的巨大差距,以及分散的基礎設施和相距甚遠的地理位置。(僅印尼一國就擁有1.7萬個島嶼。)

如何為數億名從未見過信用卡的消費者打造一款超級應用?Go-Jek和Grab使用互聯網和智能手機巧妙地打造了移動支付大軍。汽車和摩的司機收取現金,然后將其積分存入客戶的數字錢包。他們還會與周邊的代理商合作。這些代理商除了給錢包充值之外,還會幫助沒有銀行賬戶的消費者在線購買物品、支付賬單、購買保險或申請貸款。

Go-Jek與Grab正在多個領域爭搶客戶,從送貨一直到醫療咨詢。但金融服務領域的競爭引發了一場白熱化的交易競賽。Go-Jek傾向于通過并購開展合作,此舉能夠為公司提供更嚴格的掌控權。例如在印尼,公司通過收購三家首要的金融服務公司鞏固了其在支付領域的主導地位。這三家公司分別是與零售商合作的線下支付處理商,為在線商戶服務的支付公司以及一家幫助農村和工薪階層家庭購買家用電器的借貸網絡。Go-Jek將這三家公司并入了Go-Pay系統。

Grab更喜歡開展合作和設立合資企業,這種舉措能夠讓它更快地接觸更多的市場,而且已經幫助Grab獲得了印尼之外的優勢。10月,Grab宣布與萬事達卡達成合作,發行能夠讓Grab客戶與任何接受萬事達卡的商戶進行交易的預付卡。Grab還與日本的Credit Saison聯合創建了Grab Financial Services公司,并結合Grab消費者行為數據和Credit Saison在信貸分析方面的專長,給沒有銀行賬戶的客戶提供貸款。

Grab去年在印尼遭遇了挫折。當時,印尼監管方禁止外資持股比例超過49%的公司開展數字錢包業務。但Grab通過收購印尼支付初創企業Kudo以及與印尼巨頭力寶集團旗下金融服務公司Ovo開展合作,繞過了這一限制,力寶集團對商場的控股為Ovo的智能支付系統提供了購物中心和連鎖餐廳方面的優勢。Ovo的用戶相對來說較為富足,能夠讓Grab接觸馬卡里姆和二陳在哈佛學過的“金字塔底端”之外的客戶。

Like gunpowder, pasta, and paper money, the super-app is an innovation generally credited to China. Among the earliest incarnations was Alipay, the payment function created by Alibaba in 2004 in tandem with its Taobao e-commerce platform. Alipay has evolved into China’s dominant mobile-payment method, a digital wallet linked to bank accounts and credit cards and used to pay bills, transfer money to friends, book a hotel—or do just about anything else. Even more versatile is WeChat, launched by Tencent Holdings in 2011. WeChat was originally designed to exchange text messages and photos, but Tencent added an Alipay-like digital wallet function, along with a host of social features to make the app quicker, quirkier, and stickier.

For the tech giants who run them, China’s super-apps are a data El Dorado. Unlike in the U.S., where Google, Facebook, Amazon, and other tech leaders wrangle and squabble over disparate streams of data reflecting different aspects of consumer behavior, Alibaba and Tencent hoover up information across the spectrum, generating 360-degree profiles of hundreds of millions of users. Such data raises weighty privacy concerns—but for now it remains an asset that companies can monetize in relationships with advertisers and vendors, and through new products of their own.

In emulating China’s apps, Grab and Go-Jek faced an added hurdle: the limited reach of Southeast Asia’s banks. In China, more than 80% of adults have access to a bank account. Malaysia and Thailand have similar rates. But in Indonesia, the figure is only about 50%, while in the Philippines and Vietnam, it falls below 35%. Those disparities reflect wide variation in economic development, as well as fragmented infrastructure and far-flung geography. (Indonesia alone encompasses 17,000 islands.)

How to create a super-app for millions of consumers who have never even seen a credit card? Go-Jek and Grab have used the Internet and smartphones ingeniously to create armies of mobile tellers. Car and motorbike drivers collect cash and credit it to customers’ digital wallets. They toil alongside neighborhood agents who, in addition to topping up the wallets, help consumers who lack bank accounts purchase goods online, pay bills, buy insurance, or apply for loans.

Go-Jek and Grab are dueling for customers in ?arenas ranging from grocery delivery to medical advice. But the race in financial services has sparked a particularly frenzied burst of dealmaking. Go-Jek tends to prefer partnering through acquisitions, which allows tighter control. In Indonesia, for example, it bolstered its payments dominance in 2018 by acquiring three major financial services companies—an offline payments processor that works with retailers, a payment company that serves online merchants, and a saving and lending network that helps rural and working-class families buy household appliances—and merging the three into its Go-Pay system.

Grab prefers partnerships and joint ventures, which enable it to reach more markets faster—and have helped Grab get an edge outside Indonesia. In October, Grab announced a partnership with Mastercard to issue prepaid cards that Grab customers can spend with any merchant that accepts Mastercard. Grab also has paired up with Japan’s Credit Saison to found Grab Financial Services, which now offers loans to unbanked customers—combining Grab’s data on consumer behavior with Credit Saison’s expertise in credit analysis.

Grab suffered a setback in Indonesia last year when that country’s regulators barred ventures with more than 49% foreign ownership from offering digital wallets. But Grab worked around that restriction by acquiring Kudo, an Indonesian payment startup, and partnering with Ovo, a financial services firm owned by Indonesian conglomerate Lippo Group. Lippo’s shopping mall holdings give Ovo’s smartphone payment system an advantage at shopping centers and restaurant chains. Ovo’s users are also relatively affluent—allowing Grab to reach beyond the “base of the pyramid” that ?Makarim and the Tans studied at Harvard.

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即便在Grab與Go-Jek四處擴張之際,其最初的運輸之戰也是愈演愈烈,而且各類競爭方式也暗示了業務快速增長的風險。在新加坡,Grab收購Uber的舉措引發了司機的憤怒,他們抱怨合并后的公司取消了其福利,而乘客也對價格的上漲和服務水平的下降提出了抗議。(Grab已開始著手解決乘客的抱怨,包括取消下單5分鐘之內的行程取消費用等。)

兩家公司還經歷了監管方更加嚴格的審查。新加坡的競爭監管方對Grab和Uber開出了950萬美元的罰單,原因在于雙方的交易破壞了競爭,并推動價格最高上漲了15%。監管方下令Grab恢復其合并前的定價,并讓打車服務取消有關司機和出租車隊的排他性條款。此舉似乎為Go-Jek創造了機會,該公司為了在新加坡和其他市場擴張豪擲了5億美元。但Go-Jek在海外創建分公司的舉措也遇到了阻力。例如在菲律賓,監管方拒絕向Go-Jek的一項業務發放牌照,原因在于該領域對外資有限制。

有時候,行業的顛覆會體現為現實中的行業動蕩。10月,一群憤怒的摩的司機聚集在雅加達市中心的力寶大廈。抗議者要求向Grab高管提交一份最低薪資方案,該公司的總部便位于這棟大樓。在遭到拒絕之后,司機們轉而使用暴力,砸碎了前廳的窗戶,警察動用催淚瓦斯才驅散了人群。

雅加達的動蕩反映了兩家企業所處競爭市場的波動。在這個市場,迅速的增長,再加上工人以及消費者期許的提升,會讓事態迅速升級。這場動亂可能會以一場超級并購收尾,也就是綠衫巨人的一方吞并另一方。但很多投資者表示,他們如今將東南亞的超級應用行業視為這樣一個市場:在這個市場中,資本充足的企業將與大量的當地合作伙伴一道,陷入一種長期的競爭僵局。Go-Jek的投資方KKR的大衛·卡茨說:“傳統的觀點曾經認為,這是一個贏家通吃的市場。但如今沒人這么想了。”換句話說,這場競賽還遠未結束。(財富中文網)

本文另一版本登載于《財富》雜志2019年4月刊,標題為《街頭競賽》。

譯者:馮豐

審校:夏林

Even as Grab and Go-Jek expand elsewhere, their original battle over transport rages—in ways that hint at the perils of rapid growth. In Singapore, Grab’s acquisition of Uber sparked outrage from drivers, who complained that the combined companies revoked their incentive, and passengers, who protested higher prices and poorer service. (Grab has begun addressing rider complaints, including by eliminating fees for trips canceled within five minutes of booking.)

The rivals are also weathering more scrutiny from regulators. Singapore’s competition watchdog imposed fines of $9.5 million on Grab and Uber, ruling that their deal had eroded competition and driven fares up by as much as 15%. The regulator ordered Grab to restore its premerger pricing and told the service to remove exclusivity obligations on drivers and taxi fleets. This would seem to create opportunities for Go-Jek, which has committed $500 million to expanding in Singapore and other markets. But Go-Jek’s efforts to establish subsidiaries abroad have also met resistance. In the Philippines, for example, regulators have refused to license one Go-Jek business, citing restrictions on foreign ownership.

Sometimes the upheaval in the industry manifests itself as actual unrest. In October a swarm of angry motorcycle drivers converged on the Lippo Building in downtown Jakarta. Protesters demanded the chance to present a minimum wage proposal to executives from Grab, whose local headquarters are in the building. Denied an audience, the crowd turned violent, smashing the windows of the front lobby, and police cleared the scene with tear gas.

The scrum in Jakarta echoes the volatility of the markets in which Grab and Go-Jek compete—places where rapid growth and the rising expectations of workers and consumers combine to keep conditions at a rapid boil. The turmoil could conclude in a mega-merger in which one of the green-jacketed giants gobbles up the other. But many investors say they now see Southeast Asia’s super-app arena as a marketplace in which well-capitalized firms will settle into a long-term competitive standoff, alongside their myriad local partners. “The conventional view used to be that this is a winner-take-all market,” says David Katz of KKR, one of Go-Jek’s backers. “But no one thinks that now.” The race, in other words, has many laps to go.

A version of this article appears in the April 2019 issue of Fortune with the headline “Racing in the Streets.”

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